Abstract In this paper we first discuss whether or not the modern form of mercantilism that contributes to the trade deficit of the United States and other countries is a self-destructive and thus self-correcting strategy. We argue that it is not self-correcting. Then we discuss mechanisms that a trade deficit country could utilize in order to produce balanced trade.
Chinese President Xi Jinping and U. He warned that the course it pursues in addressing its maritime disputes "will be a key indicator of whether the [Asia-Pacific] region is heading towards confrontation or cooperation.
A week later, the French government released satellite imagery showing that China is building a roughly 10,foot-long runway on Fiery Cross Reef. China claims the United States is feigning concern over China's maritime activities to isolate the mainland: To their credit, the two countries are taking steps to preempt destabilizing contingencies.
In Novemberfor example, the U. Department of Defense and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense signed a memorandum of understanding on "rules of behavior for safety of air and maritime encounters" and another on "notification of major military activities. Aside from the sobering historical record—conflicts between leading powers and rising ones have often culminated in disaster—that interdependence has arguably done more than any other phenomenon to furnish a rationale for sustained cooperation between the United States and China, whose relationship lacks the sorts of organic factors that dissuade many other pairs of countries from contemplating conflict: As China's economic growth becomes more consumption-driven consumption accounted for The rebalancing of China's economy is occurring slowly, but it is gaining momentum.
Services, for example, are playing a greater role: Furthermore, by launching the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Silk Road infrastructure fund, and other economic initiatives in the Asia-Pacific, China is positioning itself to secure a growing fraction of the export contribution to its growth from within the region.
Granted, interdependence is neither a panacea nor a monolithic phenomenon. In some categories, in fact, U. At first glance those numbers would seem reassuring.
After all, a Chinese decision to liquidate a substantial fraction of its dollar holdings might induce the United States to reduce its imports of Chinese goods—and vice versa; this symmetric liability should, theoretically, compel each country to exercise restraint.
Another problematic arena of interdependence is cyberspace: The ongoing challenge of attributing attacks—and, most importantly in the U. Not surprisingly, the U. Defense Department says that one of the objectives of its new cyber strategy is to "[s]trengthen…cyber dialogue with China to enhance strategic stability.
A comparable reduction in their trade interdependence, however, would be inimical to its progression.
That phenomenon cannot prevent the United States and China from going to war; only the prudence of their leaders can do so. Still, it can continue to play a role in preventing strategic competition from devolving into unalloyed rivalry. This sort of proposition tends to elicit a cautionary invocation of Norman Angell, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning author of the book The Great Illusion.
According to the prevalent understanding of that text, Angell believed "the extraordinary interdependence of the modern financial world" rendered war between Britain and Germany impossible.
In truth, Angell believed war was a near certainty. He had no hope for a treaty that would constrain their naval race; nor did he foresee a unilateral decision by one country to withdraw from the race that would induce the other to follow suit.
Instead, Angell concluded that Britain and Germany would accelerate their contest, "which, if unchecked, [would] lead with every probability to war. In addition, our interests are more than ever interconnected….
If we are in confrontation, it will surely spell disaster for both countries and the wider world. First, the reduction in U. Second, there are some counterbalancing phenomena. In particular, because China's reliance on energy imports is poised to increase sharply over the coming decades, China will place a growing premium on stability throughout the global maritime commons—commons that are principally underpinned by U.
Third, the United States has considerably more time to shape the rise of China, a competitor-cum partner that is challenging today's order incrementally, than Britain did a century earlier to respond to the aggression of Germany, an antagonist that sought to upend the prevailing balance of power in Europe.
Still, over the long term, as China's comprehensive national power approaches America's, and its economic dependence on the United States declines, both its aversion to a military confrontation and its concern about posing more systemic challenges to liberal world order are likely to diminish.
It will also become more difficult for America's allies in the Asia-Pacific to reconcile growing military and diplomatic ties with the United States, on the one hand, and growing trade and investment relations with China, on the other.
Foreign Policy National Security U.On December 6 th the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies will host a conference on the Jones Act, a nearly year-old law that restricts the transportation of cargo between two.
China’s policies on Afghanistan, Xinjiang, Russia, terrorism, and the trade war – all have their roots in the late Cold War era. The Trump administration is employing a “gray zone. Apr 08, · Words: Length: 6 Pages Document Type: Essay Paper #: China Trade Policy China's agricultural trade policies are driven by its need to feed its massive population.
The country has quotas that average %, with % of products being duty free and total tariff lines. In addition, Antonio received his China-MBA, from Shanghai Jiaotong University, and is currently completing a second PhD at School of Economics Shanghai University, specializing in China –US Trade, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Trump-China economics.
38A The Foreign Trade (Development And Regulation) Act, No. 22 of 38B Foreign Trade (Exemption from Application of Rules in Certain Cases) Order, 38C Foreign Trade (Regulation) Rules, I-A Application for Setting up EOU/ Units in Special Economic Zone. Trade, investment and economic statistics DFAT provides a range of accurate, up-to-date statistics about Australia’s trade relationship with the rest of the world.
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